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Recent work on testimony and the norms of assertion considers cases
of expert testimony. Thinking about expert testimony clarifies which epis-
temic goods figure in the expectations placed on experts for their knowl-
edge. Examining the distinctive conditions of expert testimony and the
assumptions hearers bring to such conversational contexts can provide
broader lessons about how knowledge is represented by speakers, and
how it is gained by hearers.
Expert testimony is the focus of Jennifer Lackey’s (, ) recent
arguments over the norm of assertion. Her cases suggest that experts
are plausibly held to a different epistemic standard when speaking as ex-
perts, where this standard concerns not only the quantity of an expert’s
epistemic support for what an expert asserts, but also the quality of that
epistemic support. These cases seem to count against knowledge being
sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion; and several others have
followed Lackey in regarding such cases as important to adjudicating the
debate over the norms of assertion and practical reasoning (Carter and
Gordon , Coffman , McKinnon , Carter , Gerken ,
Green forthcoming).
I shall argue in this paper that relying on intuitions about such cases
of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning expertise, ex-
pert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony.

In particular, the cases used thus far are unstable, and refinements are
needed to clarify exactly what principles are being tested and exactly what
our intuitive judgements are tracking in such cases. But as we shall see,
once refined, such cases raise more questions than they answer.
The plan of this paper is as follows. § introduces the sufficiency prin-
ciple for epistemically permissible assertion, and notes how it does and
does not relate to the knowledge norm of assertion. § considers Lackey’s
notion of isolated second-hand knowledge, clarifying various notions of
knowledge as ‘isolated’ and of seeking an expert’s opinion. § exposes a
significant problem with relying on intuitions about cases of experts as-
serting with isolated second-hand knowledge. Section § evaluates some
potential replies.
 Principles of Permissible Assertion
In the recent literature, norms of assertion are typically cast as a neces-
sary condition on epistemically permissible assertion: an assertion, to be
epistemically acceptable, must at least meet the condition stated by the
norm, though the assertion might still be improper on other grounds (for
example if it is impolite, or irrelevant, etc.). Thus Timothy Williamson’s
knowledge rule of assertion states that
(KN) One must: assert p only if one knows that p. (, )
Competitors to the knowledge rule typically endorse this necessary condi-
tion schema, while substituting in their favoured status or state, for exam-
ple the Truth rule (Weiner ), the Rational Credibility rule (Douven
), the Reasonable-to-Believe norm (Lackey /, Ch. ), the
Supportive Reasons norm (McKinnon ), among others.
KN offers only a necessary condition on epistemically permissible
assertion; most defenders of KN refrain from endorsing a comparable
sufficiency condition on assertion, which would make knowing sufficient

for epistemically permissible assertion. One reason why fans of KN
do not do so is because KN seems implausibly strong as a sufficiency
condition:
(KN-S) One must: assert p if one knows that p.
On the KN-S rule, one must assert whatever one knows! A more plausible
sufficiency principle is the following, labelled KNA-S* by Lackey:
(KNA-S*) One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if
one knows that p.
Some are tempted to think that those committed to KN are likewise
committed to some sufficiency principle like KNA-S* (see e.g. Hawthorne
,  n. ). One idea behind the temptation goes roughly like this: if
knowledge that p is required for epistemically permissible assertion that
p (as per KN), then knowing p is what positions one, epistemically speak-
ing, for properly asserting that p; thus KNA-S* follows from KN. But this
argument is flawed. KN might be true though KNA-S* false: if one can
know that p, and thereby meet KN, but be in a conversational context
where something ‘stronger’ than knowledge is also required for permissi-
ble assertion (say, certainty, if certainty can come apart from knowledge),
then in that context one would not be properly epistemically positioned
to assert that p even while knowing p, and KNA-S* would be false. Sim-
ilarly, one might know p but be in a conversational context in which one
must know p on particular grounds in order to assert p flat-out in that
context. (Indeed, Lackey’s cases discussed below will trade on just such a
Thus Williamson, Hawthorne (, –), Turri (, , ), Benton (,
, forthcoming), Sosa (, –), and Blaauw (), among others, all defend
only (or primarily) the necessary condition. For discussion of a sufficiency condition, see
Brown  and , and Lackey as discussed below.
See Lackey (, ); such a principle, or something much like it, is endorsed by
Keith DeRose (, ).

scenario.) Because it seems that there can be cases where something over
and above knowing is required, epistemically, for proper assertion, KN
might be true though KNA-S* is false. Thus defenders of KN arguably
need not be committed to KNA-S*. Even still, some supporters of KN
have accepted, or been inclined to accept, KNA-S*. As a result, some crit-
ics have endeavoured to argue against a sufficiency principle like KNA-S*
on epistemically permissible assertion. It is to those arguments that we
now turn.
 Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge
Lackey introduces cases of what she calls isolated second-hand knowledge
(ISHK) to argue specifically against KNA-S*, because they are cases
designed to be ones where intuitively, the asserter knows, and yet intu-
itively the assertion is still (epistemically) improper. Assertions of some
proposition p based on ISHK are those where a speaker knows p only
through another’s testimony (the knowledge is entirely second-hand), and
the speaker ‘knows nothing (or very little) relevant about the matter other
than that p’ (thus it is isolated) (, ). Getting a feel for these notions
is best done by considering Lackey’s cases; though she gives several
versions of such cases (expert panelist and professor: , –;
cf. also food and movie, p. , and recommendation and cheating,
pp. –), they are structurally similar with respect to the issues of
interest here, and so any points made in this paper may be made for those
cases as well. Because space considerations prevent us from discussing
Plausibly, one who endorses Williamson’s view of KN as the unique epistemic norm
governing assertion will thereby be committed to something like KNA-S*, because on
this view, having fulfilled KN means having fulfilled the only epistemic norm, and thus
there cannot be any other epistemic norm-like requirements on speakers (thanks to Lizzie
Fricker here). But defenders of KN needn’t adopt this uniqueness claim; see e.g. Turri
(, §) for recent discussion.
For other reasons for accepting a sufficiency direction of the knowledge norm, see
Hawthorne (, ), as well as Fantl & McGrath’s (, ff.) arguments for (KJ).
Because my concern in this paper is with a specific style of counterargument against
KNA-S*, I do not here further consider what might be said in its favor.

each case, we shall concentrate on her doctor cases:
doctor: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who
has been diagnosing and treating various kinds of cancers for
the past fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was recently
referred to her office because he has been experiencing intense
abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. Matilda requested an
ultrasound and MRI, but the results of the tests arrived on her
day off; consequently, all the relevant data were reviewed by
Nancy, a competent medical student in oncology training at
her hospital. Being able to confer for only a very brief period
of time prior to Derek’s appointment today, Nancy communi-
cated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer,
without offering any of the details of the test results or the
reasons underlying her conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda
had her appointment with Derek, where she truly asserts to
him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reliable testimony, ‘I am
very sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer.’
(, )
Lackey thinks that intuitively, Matilda’s assertion is improper; but we
shall consider that at length in the next section (§). Clearly, Matilda’s
knowledge that Derek has pancreatic cancer is entirely second-hand (since
she learned this solely through Nancy’s testimony). And it is isolated in
Lackey’s sense because Matilda did not hear from Nancy any of the other
details of the test results that indicate cancer. Had Matilda discussed these
details with Nancy, then Matilda’s knowledge would not be isolated be-
cause she would know more about what evidence supports the diagno-
sis, and would thereby have ‘second-hand expertise’ (, ); or, had
Matilda herself seen the test results and assessed them for herself, her
knowledge would instead be (at least partly) first-hand.
Some however lack the intuition that Matilda knows in doctor,
because Nancy, being only a medical student, is not a peer nor an expert

of Matilda’s level. Perhaps sensing this, in Lackey  the oncologist
case is changed from Nancy being ‘a competent medical student training
at her hospital,’ to being ‘a very competent colleague in oncology’ (italics
added); I shall charitably interpret this as Nancy being a fellow doctor
and oncologist at the hospital. To get things more clear then, the case to
be used will be modified to doctor so that Nancy is not a student but a
fellow oncologist:
doctor: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who
has been diagnosing and treating various kinds of cancers for
the past fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was recently
referred to her office because he has been experiencing intense
abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. Matilda requested an
ultrasound and MRI, but the results of the tests arrived on
her day off; consequently, all the relevant data were reviewed
by Nancy, a very competent colleague in oncology. Being able
to confer for only a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s
appointment today, Nancy communicated to Matilda simply
that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without offering any
of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her
conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda had her appointment
with Derek, where she truly asserts to him purely on the basis
of Nancy’s reliable testimony, ‘I am very sorry to tell you this,
but you have pancreatic cancer.’ (, –)
Though the idea of knowing a proposition entirely second-hand seems
clear enough, one might wonder exactly what it is for one’s knowledge to
be isolated in the relevant sense. Considering cases of multiple testimo-
nial sources may seem to make one’s knowledge isolated, yet it provides
That is, one might be assuming a principle such that: testimony consisting simply
of an assertion that p from a non-expert to an expert on a matter of the expert’s expertise
does not confer knowledge (at least if the testimony is the only reason for the expert to
believe p).

more knowledge about the matter than simply that p. For example, had
Matilda received not only the testimony from Nancy as in doctor but
also similar testimony from three other competent oncologists (Drs. X,
Y, and Z) who also reviewed the test results independently and testified
to Matilda solely that their own diagnosis is cancer, without discussing
any more details, would Matilda’s knowledge still be isolated? After all,
Matilda now knows not only that Nancy concluded that p, but also that Dr.
X concluded that p, and that Dr. Y concluded that p, and that Dr. Z con-
cluded that p. Moreover, Matilda also knows that Dr. Y and Dr. Z agree in
their diagnoses, that Nancy and Dr. X agree in their diagnoses, that each
oncologist reached their conclusions independently, and so on. This is a
lot of additional knowledge compared with the doctor case; would this
added knowledge make Matilda’s knowledge that p non-isolated?
Additionally, one might wonder how much turns on the notion of seek-
ing an expert opinion. Let us suppose that giving one’s own expert opinion
typically (perhaps constitutively) requires that the expert have either first-
hand acquaintance with some relevant data in the domain of expertise
from which one employs one’s expertise in drawing a conclusion, or for
it to be thorough knowledge of all the relevant details if it is all second-
hand. The doctor cases are written as if Derek was referred to Matilda’s
office to get an expert oncologist’s opinion, but how we understand that
idea will matter to our judgments about these cases. On one interpre-
tation, Derek may be seeking an expert’s opinion such that he simply
wants any oncologist with the relevant expertise to evaluate his symp-
toms: call this approach Any-Expert. On this assumption, Matilda could
give an expert opinion without giving her own expert opinion. Yet on an-
other interpretation, Derek specifically wants Matilda’s own expert opin-
ion: call this Specific-Expert. It is worth flagging that if we read doctor
with Any-Expert as the background assumption, we are less likely to have
the intuition that Matilda’s assertion is improper than if we are assum-
ing Specific-Expert. (Note also that even when assuming the weaker Any-
A similar issue is raised by McGrath (,  n. ).
Cf. Lackey , : ‘we do not expect expert testimony to be grounded purely in
isolated second-hand knowledge.’

Expert, one might judge Matilda’s assertion in the original doctor case, in
which Nancy is a medical student but not a full doctor, to be improper for
Gricean reasons: Derek seeks a doctor’s opinion, but is in fact getting a
medical student’s opinion, and so Matilda’s assertion is at least pragmati-
cally misleading.)
Thus there are at least two dimensions on which one’s intuitions
of the doctor case can depend: these dimensions can affect how one
assesses Matilda’s assertion for propriety, even if one intuitively thinks
Matilda knows. One can interpret Nancy’s role in the original case as (i)
a less-qualified medical student, or as (ii) a fellow expert and colleague
as in doctor; and one can interpret Derek’s expectations to be captured
by either (iii) Any-Expert or (iv) Specific-Expert. The combinations of these
















Notice that one’s intuitions about epistemic propriety might be affected by
the same issues, particularly if one regards the epistemic propriety of as-
serting as an expert to be connected to how an expert represents herself
and her expertise in conversation: if speaking as an expert will be mislead-
ing when one appears to offer one’s own expert opinion even though one
did not engage one’s expertise in arriving at that opinion, then such asser-
Thanks to Dani Rabinowitz for pointing this out.

tions may also seem epistemically improper. Thus one’s background as-
sumptions, particularly given the Any-Expert/Specific-Expert distinction,
seem to matter greatly to one’s intuitions about these cases.
 Assessing for Impropriety
Lackey contends that doctor and doctor reveal assertions based on
ISHK to be epistemically improper: that Matilda’s knowledge is both iso-
lated and second-hand ‘makes it improper for her to flat-out assert this di-
agnosis to Derek’ (, ). This is because Lackey maintains that doc-
tor is a context in which Derek ‘reasonably has the right to expect the
asserter to possess more than merely isolated second-hand knowledge’;
if this expectation is not met, Derek has the right to resent Matilda’s as-
sertion (, –; thus Lackey seems to be assuming Specific-Expert).
Lackey says this impropriety is not a merely a pragmatic one of misleading
Derek with respect to this expectation; rather, ‘in my cases, ... the remain-
ing impropriety involves the asserter’s epistemic relation to that which she
asserted’ (, ), for Matilda ‘lacked the epistemic authority to flat-
out assert this diagnosis to Derek in any way at all’ (, ). If all this
is correct, then doctor and her other ISHK cases are counterexamples to
KNA-S*.
Before raising some difficulties for Lackey’s view of doctor, it is
worth noting the tension that view creates given her earlier cases of
‘selfless assertions’ (/, Ch. ). Selfless assertion cases are those
in which a subject asserts p because p is well-supported by all of the
For example, one might be implicitly assuming from the outset that expert testi-
mony is constituted by the following principle:
(E) Whenever an expert of domain D, speaking as an expert, gives a state-
ment that is either (i) not based on first-hand assessment of data relating to
D but instead offers the view of a fellow expert, or (ii) is modified to align
with political/social/institutional policies, the expert’s statement does not
qualify as an expert opinion.
Given (E), and assuming Specific-Expert, Matilda in doctor would be speaking improp-
erly in some sense, for it seems she is representing herself as giving her expert opinion
even though (E) states that what she is offering is not an expert opinion; but it is not
clear whether this is an epistemic or pragmatic (or some other) violation. Thanks to Dani
Rabinowitz for discussion here.

available evidence, yet the subject, for non-epistemic reasons, does not
believe p and so does not know p (, –). She uses another
doctor case to illustrate:
distraught doctor: Sebastian is an extremely well-known
paediatrician and researcher who has done extensive work
studying childhood vaccines. He recognises and appreciates
that all of the scientific evidence shows that there is abso-
lutely no connection between vaccines and autism. However,
shortly after his apparently normal -month-old daughter
received one of her vaccines, her behaviour became increas-
ingly withdrawn and she was soon diagnosed with autism.
While Sebastian is aware that signs of autism typically emerge
around this age, regardless of whether a child received any
vaccines, the grief and exhaustion brought on by his daughter’s
recent diagnosis cause him to abandon his previously deeply-
held beliefs regarding vaccines. Today, while performing a
well-baby check-up on one of his patients, the child’s parents
ask him about the legitimacy of the rumours surrounding
vaccines and autism. Recognizing both that the current doubt
he has towards vaccines was probably brought about through
the emotional trauma of dealing with his daughter’s condition
and that he has an obligation to his patients to present what
is most likely to be true, Sebastian asserts, ‘There is no con-
nection between vaccines and autism.’ In spite of this, at the
time of his assertion, it would not be correct to say that Sebas-
tian himself believes or knows this proposition. (, –)
Lackey maintains that the evidence had by the subjects in her selfless as-
sertion cases provide them ‘enough epistemic support’ that ‘they would
know [the supported propositions] were they to believe them’ (, 
n. ). Because Lackey judges such selfless assertions to be praisewor-
thy rather than inappropriate, she regards Sebastian to be asserting en-
tirely properly in distraught doctor; yet as we saw above, Lackey also
judges Matilda to be speaking (epistemically) improperly in doctor.
Thus Lackey seems committed to the idea that when one is speaking as

an expert, possessing first-hand access to probative evidence for p, even if
one doesn’t believe p on that evidence, is more important to the propriety
of one’s assertion that p than having isolated second-hand knowledge that
p. That is, by Lackey’s lights it would be better (so far as the permissibility
of assertion goes) for an expert to have first-hand evidence, regardless of
whether she believes what that evidence supports, than to believe or even
know on the testimony of a fellow expert.
This difficulty in Lackey’s own view notwithstanding, we can still
evaluate doctor for its applicability to a sufficiency principle like
KNA-S*. If one shares the intuition that Matilda’s assertion is improper
due to her inadequate epistemic relation to what she asserts, then KNA-S*
will seem false. But by varying the doctor case only slightly, it becomes
clear that the impropriety infecting Matilda’s assertion has nothing to do
with her epistemic relation to it. Consider the following case:
doctor: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who
has been diagnosing and treating various kinds of cancers for
the past fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was recently
referred to her office because he has been experiencing intense
abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. Matilda requested an
ultrasound and MRI, but the results of the tests arrived on her
day off; consequently, all the relevant data were reviewed by
Nancy, a very competent colleague in oncology at her hospital.
Being able to confer for only a very brief period of time
prior to Derek’s appointment today, Nancy communicated to
Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without
offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons
underlying her conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda had
her appointment with Derek with Nancy in attendance, where
Matilda truly asserts to Derek purely on the basis of Nancy’s
reliable testimony, ‘I am very sorry to tell you this, but you
have pancreatic cancer.’
Notice furthermore that if one assumes Specific-Expert in evaluating distraught
doctor, one will likely regard Sebastian’s assertion to be at least pragmatically mislead-
ing and improper in that sense. This suggests that Lackey needs her readers to assume
Any-Expert in her selfless assertion cases (so that there is no intuition of epistemic impro-
priety), but Specific-Expert in her ISHK cases (so that we have an intuition of impropriety).

In doctor, Matilda’s epistemic relation to what she asserts remains ex-
actly as it was in doctor. But in doctor, with Nancy in the room with
Matilda and Derek when Matilda asserts to him that he has pancreatic
cancer, the intuition that Matilda’s assertion is epistemically improper
vanishes: there seems to be nothing epistemically objectionable about
Matilda’s assertion. With Nancy on hand to field Derek’s questions from
first-hand knowledge, Derek would not be entitled to resent Matilda’s as-
serting based on ISHK in that context. If so, then it cannot be that the
impropriety present in doctor is due to Matilda’s epistemic relation to
what she asserts; for that epistemic relation is exactly the same in doc-
tor, where Matilda’s assertion is intuitively proper (or at least, it is not
intuitively improper). (Similar results follow from similar slight changes
to Lackey’s other cases expert panelist and professor (, –), as
well as to revisions of her ‘presumed-witness’ cases, e.g. cheating (,
). Lackey also discusses cases of ‘judgments’ by non-experts (food and
movie: , –), but I lack the intuition that the asserters in these
cases know.)
The differences between doctor and doctor help us to see the flaw
in Lackey’s assessment of her original ISHK cases. First, Lackey’s insis-
tence that Derek reasonably has the right to expect the asserter to possess
more than merely isolated second-hand knowledge depended on her as-
sumption of Specific-Expert. But the intuitive response to doctor reveals
that in fact, some weaker assumption (perhaps Any-Expert) is more apt: in
particular, Derek at most has the right to expect that someone in the con-
versation possess more than isolated second-hand knowledge, from whom
he can gain an understanding of the test results and how they support the
diagnosis. Second, from the idea that Derek reasonably has a right to
It is interesting to consider how ‘downstream’ norms of assertion that require one
to defend or retract one’s assertion (e.g. Rescorla  and Macfarlane ) would han-
dle cases such as doctor and doctor: for those norms require the speaker herself to
defend the assertion. To the extent that one shares the intuition that Matilda’s assertion
is epistemically innocuous in doctor, this puts pressure on the exact duty imposed by
such ‘defend or retract’ norms; e.g., such norms do not fit well with the assumption of
Any-Expert.
Some may balk even at this, and contend instead that Derek has no such right; or that
if he does have some kind of patient’s right to such information, that this fact places no
particularly epistemic requirement on Matilda not to assert the initial diagnosis. Rather,

expect that the asserter have more than ISHK, Lackey infers that Matilda,
who did not have more than ISHK, lacked the epistemic authority to flat-
out assert that diagnosis to Derek, and contends that this fact is what
explains the intuition of impropriety in doctor. But as shown by con-
trasting doctor with doctor, that intuition can be explained merely by
the absence of someone in the conversation who possesses the first-hand
knowledge and can explain the results to Derek. (One might suppose that
the person in the conversation who possesses the first-hand knowledge
must also be the person from whom the asserter gained her ISHK. Though
that sounds initially plausible, it may not be correct, for one can imagine
a new doctor case, doctor: Nancy has told Matilda the diagnosis (and
nothing more), but Nancy cannot make the appointment with Derek, and
so Nancy sends her oncologist colleague Rachel—who also reviewed the
lab results and so has first-hand knowledge—to be at the appointment
with Matilda and Derek. My own intuition of such a case remains just as
in doctor.)
 Strategies for Reply?
Someone convinced by Lackey’s ISHK cases might plausibly respond to
this challenge in one of two ways. One approach denies that considering
the doctor case reveals anything about Matilda’s epistemic relation to
what she asserts in Lackey’s original doctor case. Another approach con-
cedes that the doctor case reveals something important about Matilda’s
epistemic relation to what she asserts in the original doctor, but main-
tains nevertheless that her epistemic relation is still wanting. I shall
discuss these in turn.
any such responsibility is generated by healthcare policy that she provide that informa-
tion. For the sake of argument I shall assume, however, that the relevant requirement is
epistemic and not grounded in any such institutional norms.
A third reply holds fast to Specific-Expert and just insists that Matilda in doctor still
asserts (epistemically) impermissibly, thereby denying the intuition. To those inclined
to make this move, I urge them to consider their intuitions of comparative propriety:
doesn’t Matilda’s assertion in doctor seem much more appropriate than her assertion




The first approach insists that even if Matilda in doctor asserts epistem-
ically permissibly, this does not show that Matilda in doctor also asserts
epistemically permissibly. This approach looks initially unpromising, for
it has the burden of explaining why it would be that Matilda’s assertion
in doctor, but not in doctor, is epistemically permissible, given that
Matilda’s epistemic relation to what she asserts remains exactly the same
in each case. I can envision two ways in which one might discharge this
burden: one appeals to a defeater, the other appeals to group assertion.
I’ll briefly argue that neither route offers an adequate defense.
One attempt to discharge the burden of explaining the difference in
epistemic permissibility between doctor and doctor might be by ap-
pealing to some kind of defeater: perhaps the ISHK cases, such as Lackey’s
doctor, can be subject to a kind of overriding defeater which kicks in
when a person who possesses more than merely ISHK is alongside the
asserter in the conversational context while she asserts. In doctor this
has the effect of defeating the epistemic impermissibility of the assertion
based solely on ISHK; but in the absence of this defeater, the cases of as-
sertions based entirely on ISHK are impermissible, and the existence of
these cases is sufficient to undermine KNA-S*.
This first envisioned reply does not succeed. Constructing an account
of such defeaters might suffice to show how Matilda’s assertion in doctor
is epistemically permissible even if her assertion in doctor is not; but it
does so at the cost of making the epistemic permissibility of assertion de-
pend on something other than the speaker’s epistemic relation to what is
asserted. And once one agrees that the epistemic relation of the speaker to
what is asserted is not what makes for an assertion’s epistemic permissibil-
ity, one jettisons the crucial premise of Lackey’s project, namely, that cases
of ISHK undermine KNA-S* because they are cases where the asserter’s
epistemic relation to what is asserted ought (given KNA-S*) to make the
assertion epistemically permissible.
Another way to explain the difference in epistemic permissibility be-
tween the assertions in doctor and doctor appeals to the idea that in
doctor, with her colleague present in the room, Matilda is plausibly un-
derstood as speaking for them both. On this idea, the two doctors to-
gether assert to Derek that he has cancer, even if only one of them does
the talking. In doctor, if the assertion is coming from both the oncol-

ogists, it is not an assertion of second-hand knowledge, and this would
explain why intuitively, the assertion is epistemically permissible in doc-
tor while the relevant assertion in doctor is intuitively not epistemi-
cally permissible.
There are interesting and subtle issues raised by this example, such as
(i) whether a member of a group (in this case, a group of two) can have,
and express through assertion, first-hand knowledge simply by being part
of a testimonial chain that includes someone who has first-hand knowl-
edge, and (ii) whether speaking as a group enables an expert member of
the group to fulfil a background principle of evaluation like Specific-Expert
(and these issues are beyond the scope of the present paper). But taken
simply as an explanation of the difference in epistemic permissibility be-
tween the assertions in doctor and doctor, this move is highly prob-
lematic. For if this move is plausible in the case of doctor, there does not
seem to be any principled reason why it is unavailable to appeal to in the
case of doctor: for it does not seem that Matilda’s colleague must to be in
the room in order for Matilda to be speaking for them both. Indeed, if we
imagine that in doctor, Matilda’s assertion is prefaced by ‘I’ve spoken
with my colleague about your lab results, and we’re sorry to have tell you
that you have pancreatic cancer’, it will seem as though Matilda is speak-
ing for both herself and her (absent) colleague. So, far from this move
being able to explain the difference in epistemic assertability, it actually
provides a recipe for explaining away the original intuition of epistemic
impropriety in doctor.
. Defense 
So much for the first line of defense. A second response to our challenge
proceeds by claiming that Matilda lacks the requisite epistemic authority
to assert in doctor because her epistemic relation to the asserted
diagnosis is more subtle than had been previously appreciated, and this
is a subtlety brought out by considering doctor: in order to assert the
Thanks to Lizzie Fricker for raising such a case. One might think that this move is
supported by considering a further modified case: if we imagine that the colleague is in
the room with Matilda but is hidden, the impropriety intuition about Matilda’s assertion
remains (at least for some). However, as I discuss in the next paragraph, this intuition
is also unstable, for it is unclear that the location of the colleague needs to matter to
whether Matilda may speak for the group.

diagnosis to Derek, Matilda’s epistemic relation must include knowing
(or having good reason to believe) that someone can explain to Derek why
that diagnosis is the right one given the lab results. More generally,
Expert Norm: it is an expert’s responsibility, qua (expert) asserter, to
assert q (flat-out) to a hearer only if the expert knows that
q and knows, or has good reason to believe, that someone
(with more than ISHK) can explain why q to the hearer in
that context.
Thus having adequate epistemic authority to assert, qua expert, in these
special contexts requires a strong epistemic relation (though a slightly
indirect relation) to the proposition asserted; and in these contexts, this
is a relation requiring more than simply ISHK. (As Lackey puts it, one
must have the right ‘quality,’ and not just quantity, of epistemic support:
, .) It is precisely because experts typically satisfy the epistemic
requirements of both asserter and explainer that Lackey’s cases attract in-
terest: such cases exploit scenarios wherein the expert seems (given KNA-
S*) to have just enough epistemic backing to assert, but not enough (or the
right quality) to explain.
This response looks more promising, for it is able to capture the dif-
ferent intuitions about each of the above doctor cases, while preserving
Lackey’s aim of showing assertions based merely on ISHK to be problem-
atic in certain expert cases. But this solution has two drawbacks. First,
the kind of epistemic relation required by Expert Norm in fact invokes
two epistemic relations, namely one to the asserted proposition, and one
to the proposition that someone in the conversation can explain or sup-
port the proposition asserted. In so doing, it does not rule out an expert
Thanks to John Turri for raising this idea.
It is unclear, however, what Lackey means by ‘quality’. It might be defined in terms
of some knowledge being either non-isolated or (partly) first-hand (indeed, Lackey seems
to talk about it in this way in , ff.). Or it might be defined in terms of one’s source
of knowledge, be it by way of testimony, the senses, or reasoning, etc.: if so, then it seems
to track merely the first- vs. second-hand distinction. But questions still loom about the
quantity/quality distinction: e.g. does someone who has one sound deductive argument
for p have a higher quality, but lower quantity, of epistemic support for p than another
person who has four inductive (and no deductive) arguments for p? For these reasons, I
have largely avoided the terminology of quality/quantity in this paper.

asserting p with only ISHK of p, so long as the expert also knows or has
good reason to believe that someone else in the conversation can explain
why p. Thus Expert Norm is of no help to Lackey’s avowed aim to show
that the impropriety of such assertions stems from the asserter’s epistemic
relation to the asserted proposition: for Expert Norm does not deliver the
results that an expert’s assertion of p is flawed because he or she lacks
some epistemic authority or epistemic position with respect to p.
The second drawback is this: arguably Expert Norm’s second epis-
temic relation is too demanding. For in doctor Matilda could assert
to Derek in violation of the responsibility set out by Expert Norm, yet
add qualifications that explain why she does so. For example, given only
her ISHK, Matilda could plausibly assert to Derek (without having any
colleagues present) and add: ‘I have not had time to review all the test re-
sults to my satisfaction yet, so I’m not currently in a position to provide all
the details that you might like, beyond the unfortunate diagnosis that I’m
sorry to have to give you, and which is not in doubt. We should definitely
make another appointment for you soon so that we can review it together
and answer all your questions.’ Derek might well be disappointed with
this; but it seems implausible that he could reasonably resent Matilda’s
assertion for being epistemically inadequate.
Lackey considers such an addition to Matilda’s assertion (, ; cf.
also ): for example, Matilda could add to her assertion, ‘but I myself
have not seen any of your tests results, nor do I have any specific reasons
to offer to defend this diagnosis’. Yet Lackey thinks adding this would
not
eliminate the wrongness or epistemic impropriety of [Matilda’s
initial assertion]. Derek would still rightly feel resentful, even
incensed, that his oncologist had flat-out asserted a cancer
diagnosis to him without being able to offer any direct support
on its behalf. (, )
Thanks to John Turri here.
The second clause (‘nor do I have...’) seems conspicuously designed to elicit an in-
tuition of impropriety, since it invokes having to defend the diagnosis. But worse, that
clause seems false, or at least misleading, given that Matilda does have a specific reason
for the diagnosis: her trustworthy expert colleague, who had first-hand access to the test
results, testified to it.

I confess that I don’t find this plausible at all. Any residual resentment
Derek might have is most plausibly moral or professional in nature: per-
haps one’s doctor should only deliver news of a cancer diagnosis in a con-
text where the patient can learn more about the diagnosis, precisely be-
cause it is the compassionate thing to do, because it engenders trust in
one’s doctors, and so on. But these would be moral or professional or
prudential norms, not epistemic ones. Likewise, it may be that when
speaking as experts (and perhaps especially, when delivering bad news to
patients) it may be that one has a duty to be explicit in one’s communi-
cation, which includes whenever possible giving more details about what
one knows. But this duty is plausibly simply a Gricean one such that one
must cancel the conversational implicature that one is able to be as explicit
as an expert is expected to be on that occasion.
 Conclusion
In this paper I have defended KNA-S* from a certain style of counterex-
ample. Though I have focused on Lackey’s cases here, it is worth noting
that the strategy developed to challenge the common intuitions about
such cases will arguably extend (mutatis mutandis) to any attempted coun-
terexample to a sufficiency direction of the norm of assertion. I have not
here presented positive arguments that knowledge, even if isolated and
second-hand, is sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion. It may
turn out that a sufficiency direction of the knowledge norm is implausible
for other reasons. My aim has been to argue that relying on cases of
isolated second-hand knowledge, in assessing the epistemic propriety
Coffman  raises this point.
Indeed, perhaps doctors should only deliver such news in a hedged or indirect man-
ner rather than the direct method of flat-out asserting them, since the latter seems too
blunt: much better than ‘You have cancer’ is ‘The test results indicate that you have can-
cer,’ or ‘I’m sorry to have to tell you that it appears you have cancer’: see Sparks et al.
, , and , Appendix C.
It is worth considering versions of doctor where the diagnosis given by Matilda
is that Derek does not have cancer; is such an assertion intuitively epistemically imper-
missible? If not, then perhaps the personal (pragmatic) stakes of the hearer matter to an
assertion’s epistemic propriety; but I cannot explore this further here.
For discussion of ‘one-off Grice’ cases of non-explicit messaging, see Fricker 
and Hawthorne .
See especially Brown ,  and , –, and Levin , –.

of an expert’s testimony, is problematic for instructive reasons. First,
one’s intuitions about them depend on several crucial assumptions (and
perhaps more assumptions not discussed here) which themselves require
clarification and argument. And second, reflecting on such cases reveal
subtle issues distinctive of expert testimony on which there is currently
no consensus and which deserve further exploration: do we expect of
experts that when speaking as experts they are giving their own expert
opinion which has been formed by engaging their expertise in a first-hand
manner with the relevant evidence or data? (If we do, is that expectation
reasonable?) Do we expect that experts always have an obligation to
explain to a non-expert what is behind the formation of their opinion?
Are there any conditions under which experts may defer to the authority
of other experts for a second-hand opinion, or a communal consensus, for
the purpose of providing timely efficient testimony to non-experts? Such
questions await further investigation.
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Blaauw, Martijn. . “Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Asser-
tion.” Analysis : –.
Brown, Jessica. . “The Knowledge Norm of Assertion.” Philosophical
Issues : –.
Thanks to Charity Anderson, Lizzie Fricker, Sandy Goldberg, and John Turri for
discussion, to two anonymous referees, and especially to Dani Rabinowitz who read and
commented on several drafts. This publication was also made possible through the sup-
port of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this
publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John
Templeton Foundation.

——. . “Knowledge and Assertion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research : –.
——. . “Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Prac-
tical Reasoning.” In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Asser-
tion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carter, J. Adam. . “Engel on Knowledge and Assertion.” In A. Meylan
J. Dutant, D. Fassio (ed.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, –. Univer-
sity of Geneva.
Carter, J. Adam and Gordon, Emma C. . “Norms of Assertion: The
Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.” Philosophia : –.
Coffman, E. J. . “Two Claims about Epistemic Propriety.” Synthese
: –.
DeRose, Keith. . The Case for Contextualism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Douven, Igor. . “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.” The
Philosophical Review : –.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. . Knowledge in an Uncertain
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fricker, Elizabeth. . “Stating and Insinuating.” Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society, Supplementary Volumes : –.
Gerken, Mikkel. . “Same, Same But Different: the Epistemic Norms of
Assertion and Practical Reasoning.” Philosophical Studies : –.
Green, Adam. forthcoming. “Deficient Testimony is Deficient Teamwork.”
Episteme .
Hawthorne, John. . Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
——. . “Some Comments on Fricker’s ‘Stating and Insinuating’.” Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes : –.
Lackey, Jennifer. . “Norms of Assertion.” Noûs : –.
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